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TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION FROM
THE JUVENILE COURT
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
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Transfer of jurisdiction refers to the process by which a
juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction and transfers a
juvenile case to the criminal courts for prosecution. This
process, variously described as waiver, certification, or
bind-over, has been a unique part of the juvenile court
system since the establishment of the first juvenile court.
See Kemplen v Maryland, 428 F(2d) 169, 173 (4th Cir
1970) ("There is no proceeding for adults comparable
directly to the juvenile jurisdiction waiver hearing.").
Although virtually all jurisdictions permit transfer, the
criteria and procedures for transfer vary from state to
state. See IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts (1980) [hereinafter cited as_IJA-ABA Standards]; S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles ch 4 (2d ed 1980}.
The concept of transfer entails an implicit recognition
that the juvenile court system should not be available to
all children:
/
Some acts are so offensive to the community that the arbitrary line drawn at eighteen cannot acceptably be used to
protect the alleged wrongdoer. The serious offender should
not be permitted to escape the criminal justice system simply because he or she is a day or a year short of eighteen. As
age eighteen approaches, credible argument can be made
that the juvenile court's always inadequate resources should
not be devoted to those youthful wrongdoers whose offenses are so serious or who appear to be so incorrigible as
to be unworthy of or beyond help. IJA-ABA Standards at 3.
See also In re Mack, .22 App(2d) 201, 203, 260 NE(2d}
619, 620-21 (1970) ("The purpose of [transfer] is to protect
the public in those cases where rehabilitation appears
unlikely and circumstances indicate that if the charge is
ultimately established society would be better served by
the criminal process by reason of the greater security
which may be achieved or the deterring effect which that
process is thought to accomplish.").
This view of transfer proceedings is not universally accepted: "Others argue that the existence of this loophole
[transfer] in the juvenile system indicates a half-hearted
commitment to treatment and a continued allegiance to
retribution on the part of society, an allegiance that is
particularly distasteful because it applies to the very persons whom the separate juvenile court system was de-
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signed to protect." P. Piersma, J. Ganousis, A. Volenik, H.
Swanger & P. Connell, Law and Tactics in Juvenile Cases
274 (3d ed 1977}.
In Ohio, transfer proceedings are governed by RC
2151.26 and Juvenile Rule 30. See State v Adams, 69
OS(2d) 120, 123,431 NE(2d} 326, 329 (1982} ("R.C.
2151.26 and Juv. R. 30 provide the procedural mechanism by which a juvenile offender may be 'bound over' to
the adult court ...."). Juvenile courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over persons under the age of 18 who are
charged with criminal conduct. RC 2151.23(A}(1). Only a
properly transferred juvenile may be prosecuted in the
criminal courts. As one court has stated: "Failure to comply with the provisions of R.C. 2151.26 ... deprives the
Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction over a juvenile
defendant.'' State v Riggins, 68 App(2d} 1, 4, 426 N E(2d}
504, 507 (1980}. A prosecution in criminal court on the
mistaken belief that the child was over 18 at the time of
the offe.nse is a "nullity." RC 2151.26(E). Generally, a
hearing is required before a child can be transferred to
the criminal courts. However, there is one situation in
which a transfer hearing is not required. RC 2151.26(G)
provides that a child who has been transferred and convicted and who is subsequently charged with aggravated
murder, murder, an aggravated felony of the first or second degree, or a felony of the first or second degree
shall be prosecuted as an adult.
Constitutional considerations also affect transfer procedures. In Kent v. United States, 383 US 541 (1966), the
U.S. Supreme Court considered a challenge to transfer
proceedings conducted pursuant to the D.C. Code. Kent
was taken into custody for rape. As a 16 year old, he was
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. The juvenile court,
however, transferred his case for trial as an adult. The
transfer was accomplished without a hearing or written
reasons. In addition, the court failed to provide Kent's attorney with access to Kent's social service file. On review,
the Supreme Court held that the transfer proceedings
were invalid. According to the Court, transfer is a "critically important," id. at 556, stage of the juvenile process
and "there is no place in our system of law for reaching
a result of such tremendous consequences without
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ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance
of couris~el,-wlttiout a sfatement'ofreason-S:''-/(f"af554.
See generallyPaulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 The Supreme
Court Review 16i
.
Whether the Court intended to rest its decision in Kent
on statutory cir constitutional grounds is not entirely clear.
At one point in the opinion, Justice Fortas wrote: "The
Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States
Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit provide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we
go no further." /d. at 556. Moreover, the dissenting
Justices believed the case involvedonly.astatutory
issue. /d. at 568 ("This case involves the construction of
a statute applicable only to the District of Columbia.").
Neverthele.§s, gtl"l~r g_art§ gJ !h~_fo,rtftsgpj1Jiprtin9icate a
constitutional basis, One passage ree1ds: "We. b~lieve
that this result is required by the statute read In the context of constitutional principles relating to due process
and the assistance of counsel:'ld. at 557. hi another
passage hewr()tethat a transfer hearing ''must measure
up to tlie essentials of dlle- processa'n!Halttl"eatment."
/d. at 562. Significantly, the Court quoted this passage in
In re Gault, 387 US 1 (1967): "We reiterate this view ...
as a requir~ment which is part of theDue Process
Clause of the. Fourteenth Amendmentof our Constitution." /d. at 30-31.
Although there are some exceptions, most courts view
Kent as establishing constitutional standards. For example, the Third Circuit has stated: ii[l]tls
view that
Kent, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in In re Gault ... sets forth certain principles of-constitutional dimension}'Unit~d States ex rei
TurnerVRlin111~"43f3 f(~a}839, B/tr42=(aH tTfl971).
Accord Geboy v Gray, 471 F(2d) 575, 579 (7th Cir 1973);
Powell v H()()ker, 4,53 F(2d)-652; S54(~nti,eir-'19!1y,- overruled on other grounds, Harris v Procunier, 498 F(2d) 576
(9th Cir 1974); Kemp!en v Maryland, 428 F(2d) 169 (4th
Cir 1970); lnge v Slayton, 395 F. Supp 560, 564-65 (ED Va
1975), appeal dismissed, 541 F(2d) 277 (4th Cir 1976). But
see State v Steinbauer, 216 So(2d) 214, 217-18 (Fia 1968),
cert. denied,398 US 914 (1970); lnreBulla,rd,22NC App
245, 248, 206 SE(2d) 305, 307, aP,pea/ dismissed, 285 NC
758, 209 SE(2d) 279 (1974); Cradle v, Peytori, 208 Va 243,
246, 156 SE(2d) 874, 877, cert, .denied, ~92 Uq 945 (1967).
The Ohio Courts treat Kent as a constitutional case.
See State v Adams, 69 OS(2d) 120, 127 nA, 431 NE(2d)
326,331 n.~(19f32); Statev Qviedo, 5,~pp(~cl)168, 170, 5
OBR 351, 353, 450 NE(2d) 700, 703 (1982); State v Riggins, 68 App(2d) 1, 6, 426 NE(2d) 504,508 (1980); In re
Mack, 22 App(2d) 201, 203, 260 NE(2d) 619, 621 (1970}.

commented that it "has never attempted to prescribe
criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that
must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in
adult court." /d. at 537. Constitutional challenges to transfer statutes typically have been based on vagueness
grounds, but these challenges generally have been rejected. E.g., Speck v. Auger, 558 F(2d) 394 (8th Cir.}, cert.
denied, 434 US 999 (1977} (construing the Iowa statute};
Donald L v Superior Court, 7 Cal(3d) 592, 601, 498 P(2d}
1098, 1104, 102 Cal Rptr 850, 856 (1972}; Davis v State,
297 So(2d) 289, 291-93 (Fia 1974}; State v Gibbs, 94
Idaho 908, 916, 500 P(2d} 209, 217 (1972); State v
Smagula, 117 NH 663, 669, 377 A(2d) 608, 612 (1977}; In
re Bullard, 22 NC App 245, 247-48, 206 SE(2d) 305, 307,
appeal dismissed, 285 NC 758, 209 SE(2d} 279 (1974).
But see State ex rei Hunter, 387 So(2d) 1086, 1090 (La
1980}.
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Age
A child 15 years or older may be transferred to the
criminal courts for trial. RC 2151.26(A}(1}; Juv A 30(A).
Accordingly, children under 15 years of age are not subject to transfer, regardless of the crime charged. The
child's age at the time of the offense, rather than at the
time of the transfer hearing, controls.
Offenses
Transfer is permitted only if the complaint alleges that
the child has committed an act that would constitute a
felony if committed by an adult. RC 2151.26(A); Juv R
30(A). There are no common law crimes in Ohio-only
statutory crimes. RC 2901.03(A}. An offense specifically
classified as a felony in the Revised Code is a felony
regardless of the penalty which may be imposed. RC
2901.02(D). Similarly, an offense classified as a misdemeanor is a misdemeanor regardless of the penalty
which may be imposed. /d. Any offense not specifically
classified is a felony if imprisonment for more than one
year may be imposed as a penalty. RC 2901.02(E).

our
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Probable Cause
Before a child may be transferred, the court must find
that there is probable cause to beli.eve that he has committed the alleged act. RC 2151.26(A}(2}; Juv A 30(A}.
There must be probable cause (1) that a felony has been
committed and (2} that the child is the person who has
committed that felony. See generally IJA-ABA Standards
37-38; Davis, The Efficacy of a Probable Cause Requirement in Juvenile Proceedings, 59 NC L Rev 723 (1981}.
Amenability to Treatment
Before a child may be transferred, the court must find
that there are reasonable grounds to believe (1} that he is
not amenable to care or rehabilitation or further care or
rehabilitation in any facility for delinquent juveniles and
(2} that the safety of the community may require legal
restraint for a period extending beyond his majority. RC
2151.26(A}(3}; Juv A 30(C}.
Juvenile Rule 30(E) requires the court to consider the
following factors in determining whether a child is amenable to treatment:
(1} Age. See State v Tilton, No. 384 (7th Dist Ct App,
Harrison, 6-23-83} (due to the maturity of the child, he
would not be amenable to treatment as a juvenile}; State
v Holt, No. 81AP-661 (10th Dist Ct App, Franklin, 3-30-82}
(18 years old at time of trial};

JUVENILES SUBJECT TO TRANSFER
RC 2151.26 and Juvenile Rule 30 specify which
children are subject to transfer and what criteria apply.
Transfer is permitted only for juveniles of specified ages
and for certain types of offenses. In addition, the court
must find that there is probable cause to believe that the
child has committed the offense and that he is not amenable to treatment in the juvenile system.
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to consider the constitutionality of the standards used in transfer proceedings. In Breed v. Jones, 421 US 519 (1975}, the Court
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indictment;
(9) the trial of the juvenile's associates in the alleged
offense in an adult court;
(10) other factors;
(11) effect of transfer on public's respect for law
enforcement and law compliance;
(12) community attitude toward the specific offense.
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime 78 appendix (1967). See
also Note, Waiver of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Courts, 30
Ohio St LJ 132 (1969) (surveying factors Ohio juvenile
judges used in making transfer determinations under
prior statute).
The IJA-ABA Standards adopt a restrictive approach to
transfer, permitting it only for "extraordinary juveniles in
extraordinary factual circumstances." IJA-ABA Standards
at 39. The criteria for transfer are: (1) the seriousness of
the offense, (2) prior record of adjudicated delinquency
involving the infliction or threat of significant bodily injury,
(3) the likely inefficacy of the dispositions available to the
juvenile court as demonstrated by previous dispositions
of the juvenile, and (4) the appropriateness of the services and dispositional alternative available in the criminal
justice system for dealing with the juvenile's problems,
and whether they are, in fact, available./d. (emphasis
added). The Standards reject "the public interest as a
justification for waiver." /d. at 40.

(2) Mental and physical health;
(3) Prior juvenile record. See State v Carter, 27 OS(2d)
135, 138, 272 NE(2d) 119, 121 (1971) ("many court appearances"); State v Whiteside, 6 App(3d) 30, 35, 6 OBR
140, 145, 452 NE(2d) 332, 338 (1982) ("appellant had a
record as a juvenile delinquent"); State v Oviedo, 5
App(3d) 168, 171,5 OBR 351,354,450 NE(2d) 700, 704
0982) ("history of delinquency ... included such
charges as petty theft, breaking and entering, receiving
stolen property, theft, criminal mischief and criminal
damaging.").
(4) Previous efforts to treat or rehabilitate. See State v
Carter, 27 OS(2d) 135, 138, 272 NE(2d) 119, 121 (1971)
(prior commitment to correctional school); State v
Whiteside, 6 App(3d) 30, 35, 6 OBR 140, 145, 452 NE(2d)
332, 338 (1982) (prior treatment at the Ohio Youth Commission); State v Oviedo, 5 App(3d) 168, 171, 5 OBR 351,
354,450 NE(2d) 700, 704 (1982) (prior probation); State v
Ridgley, No L-80-241 (6th Dist Ct App, Lucas, 3-27-81) (4
prior commitments to Ohio Youth Commission);
(5) Family environment. See State v Hawkins, No. 3462
(9th Dist Ct App, Lorain, 6-8-83) (unstable family situation); State v Arnold, No. L-80-269 (6th Dist Ct App,
Lucas, 6-12-81) (family had a long history of antisocial
behavior and criminal activity); and
(6) School record. See State v Hawkins, No 3462 (9th
Dist Ct App, Lorain, 6-8-83} (suspended from school
eight times}; State v Arnold, No. L-80-269 (6th Dist Ct
App, Lucas, 6-12-81) (truancy problem and not currently
attending school}.
Although the juvenile court must consider all of these
factors, "not all of the relevant factors need be resolved
against the juvenile in order to justify the transfer ...."
State v Oviedo, 5 App(2d) 168, 171,5 OBR 351,354-55,
450 NE(2d) 700, 705 (1982). In evaluating the "safety of
the community," the court may consider the nature of the
offense, the existence of aggravating circumstances, and
the extent of any apparent pattern of antisocial conduct.
/d. at 171-72. See also State v Carter, 27 OS(2d) 135, 136,
272 NE(2d) 119, 120 (1971) ijuvenile court cited aggravated character of offense-armed robbery-in the
transfer order). RC 2151.26(8) requires the court to consider whether the victim of the alleged offense was 65
years of age or older or was permanently or totally disabled at the time of the offense. See State v Grooms, No
374 (4th Dist Ct App, Adams, 9-3-81) (78 year old victim}.
One survey of juvenile court judges revealed that the
following factors, in the order of the frequency of their
listing, were considered in making transfer decisions:
(1) seriousness of the alleged offense;
(2) record and history of the juvenile, including prior contacts with police, court, or other official agencies;
(3) aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner in
which the offense was committed;
(4) sophistication, maturity, emotional attitude of the
juvenile;
(5) proximity of juvenile's age to maximum age of juvenile
court jurisdiction;
(6) existence of more appropriate procedures, services,
and facilities in the adult court that would increase the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation;
(7) the possible need for a longer period of incarceration;
(8) existence of evidence sufficient for a grand jury

PROCEDURE
Hearing and Investigation
In Ohio RC 2151.26 and Rule 30 govern the transfer
hearing and investigation. In Kent the Supreme Court
held that "an opportunity for a hearing which may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver
order." 383 U.S. at 561. In explaining the hearing requirement, the Court wrote: "We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of
the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual
administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing
must mea:;;ure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment." /d. at 562.
Rule 30 establishes a two-step hearing procedure.
First, a preliminary hearing is held to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe the child has committed a felony. The child, the prosecutor, or the court may
move lor a preliminary hearing. See United States v
Williams, 459 F(2d) 903, 908-09 (2d Cir 1972) (child
should be advised of his right to be proceeded against as
a juvenile and of all the consequences of waiving that
right). If the court finds probable cause, the proceedings
are continued until a full investigation is completed, at
which time a second hearing is held to determine
whether jurisdiction should be transferred to the criminal
courts.
The focus of the second hearing is the amenability of
the child to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. A
social history may be prepared and used for this purpose. Juv R 32(A)(2). The "full investigation" required by
the rule and statute also includes a mental and physical
examination by a public or private agency or other qualified person. This examination may be waived by the
juvenile, and refusal to submit to the examination
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·constitutes a waiver. RC 2151.26(C) (waiver must be
"competently and intelligently made"); Juv R 30{F).
Although the mental and physical examinations may be
waived, neither the investigation nor the hearing may be
waived. State v Newton, No. F-82-17 (6th Dist Ct App,
Fulton, 6-10-83).

without waiver." Haziel v United States, 404 F(2d) 1275,
1279 (DC Cir 1968). See also IJA-ABA: Standards Relating
to Counsel for Private Parties 161-68 (1980); Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young
Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 Minn
L Rev 167, 224-30 (1980).

Right to Counsel
Juvenile Rule 4(A) provides for the right to counsel at
all juvenile court hearings. See also RC 2151.352. The
right to counsel at transfer hearings is also constitutionally required. See Geboy v Gray, 471 F(2d) 575, 579 (7th Cir
1973); Kemplen v Maryland, 428 F(2d) 169, 175 (4th Cir
1970); lnge VSiaytcfn·, 39S'ESup"f:f560;·566'(EDVa 1975},
appeal dismissed, 541 F(2d) 277 (4th Cir 1976); James v
Cox, 323 F. Supp 15, 20 (ED Va 1971); Steinhauer v State,
206 So(2d) 25, 27 (Fia 1968), cert. denied, 398 US 914
(1970). In Kent the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "counsel must be afforded to the child in waiver proceedings,"
383 US at 562-63, and that "there is no place in our.
system of law forreaching a result of such tremendous
consequences ..• without effective assistance of
counsel ...." /d. at 554.
Rule 4(A) also provides that in the case of indigency,
the child has the right to appointed counsel. See also RC
2151.352. This right is also constitutionally required.
Kemplen v Maryland, 428F(2d) 169, 175 (4th Cir 1970). In
criminal trials the Sixth Amendment _right to counsel includes the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants. See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963);
Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25 (1972); Scott v Illinois,
440 US 367 (1977). In Gault the court held that the appointment of counse.l is required in a delinquency adjudicationifthecbild.is "unable to afford to employ
counsel." 387 US at 42.
Usually, the rightto co.uns.el maybewaived.ln Qhio,
however, the right to counsel at a transfer hearing may
· not be waived. Juvenile Rule 3 provides that a child's
"right to be represented by counsel at a hearing to determine whether the juvenile court shall relinquish its
jurisdiction for purposes of criminal prosecution may not
be waived."
The right to counsel includes the right to effective
assistance of counsel. This is the rule regarding the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Strickland v.
Washington, 104 S Ct 2052 (1984) (Sixth Amendment requires reasonably effective assistance of counsel). The
Supreme Court's references to "effective assistance" of
counsel in Kent indicates that the same rule applies to
the due process right of counsel in transfer proceedings.
383 US at 558. See Geboy v Gray, 471 F(2d) 575 (7th Cir
1973) (noting counsel showed a "notable lack of zeal" in
attempting to find alternatives to transfer).
The function of counsel at a transfer hearing is to
challenge the evidence offered by the prosecution and to
adduce evidence that the child is amenable to treatment
in the juvenile system. As the Supreme Court noted in
Kent: "If the staff's submissions include materials which
are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel to 'denigrate' such matter." 383
US at 563. Another court has commented: "The child's
advocate should search for a plan, or perhaps a range of
plans, which may persuade the court that the welfare of
the child and the safety of the community can be served

Notice
Juvenile Rule 30(8) requires that written notice of the
time, place and nature of the transfer heating be given to
the parties at least three days prior to the hearing. See
also RC 2151.26(D) (notice to parents or guardian and
counsel). Adequate notice is an essential aspect of due
process~See WolffvMcDohnell;418 US 539, 564 {1974)
(prison disciplinary hearings); Morrissey v Brewer, 408
US 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation hearings). Notice
must be given sufficiently in advance ofthe hearing to
permit adequate preparation. See Geboy v Gray, 471
F(2d) 575, 578-79 (7th Cir 1973); Kemplen v Maryland,
428 F(2d) 169, 175 (4th Cir 1970); Miller.v Quatsoe, 332 F.
Supp 1269, 1276 (ED Wis 1971). See also In re Gault, 387
US 1, 33 (1967) ("Notice, to complywith due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of
scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable
opportunity to prepare will be afforded .... :').
Notice also must be sufficiently specific to appraise
the parties of the nature of the charges. See United
States ex rei Turner v Rundle, 438 F(2d) 839, 842 (3d Cir
1971). See also In re Gault, 387 US 1, 33 (1967) ("Notice,
to comply with due process requirements ... must set
forth the alleged misconduct with particularity."). Moreover, it must indicate the purpose of the hearing. See
James v Cox ••323F. Supp 15; 20 (ED Va 1981); State v
Gibbs, 941daho 908,914-15, 500 P{2d) 209,215-16 (1972).
Finally, the proper parties must receive notice. See Miller
v Ouat~ge, :33gf.§l)J>.pJ?§!:}!J.276,(J::DyYis 1971);
Crandellv State, 539 P(2d) 398,401 (Okla Grim App
1975).
Standard of Proof
Juvenile Rule 30(C) requires the court to find reasonable grounds to believe that the child is not amenable to
rehabilitation and that the safety o.f the community may
require legal restraint beyond the child's majority. See
also RC 2151.26(A)(3). commenting on this standard, the
Ohio Supreme Court has written:"[T)he 'investigation' is
not required to ~how That Hie child cannot be rehabilitated as a juvenile but only that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he cannot be rehabilitated." State
v Carmichael, 35 OS(2d) 1, 6, 298 NE(2d) 568, 572 (1973},
cert. denied, 414 US 1161 (1974). The Court also held that
the juvenile court has "considerable latitude within which
to determine whether it should retain jurisdiction." /d.
(syllabus 1 & 2). See also State v Whiteside, 6 App(3d)
30, 452 NE(2d) 332 (1982).
In other jurisdictions, the standard of proof on the issue
of nonamenabilityvaries. Some jurisdictions require
"substantial evidence," while others require a "preponderance of evidence." Still others have adopted a "clear
and convincing evidence" standard, a standard also
found in the IJA-ABA Standards. See S. Davis, Rights of
Juveniles 4-17 (2d ed 1980}. IJA-ABA Standards at 39.
Evidence
In many jurisdictions the rules of evidence are relaxed
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in transfer hearings because. these hearings are considered dispositional in nature. See S. Davis, Rights of
Juveniles 4-17 (2d ed 1980). But see In re Anonymous, 14
Ariz App 466, 484 P(2d) 235 (1971) (only competent evidence admissible); In re Harris, 218 Kan 625, 544 P(2d)
1403 (1976) (transfer may not be based on inadmissible
hearsay); People v Morris, 57 Mich App 573, 226 NW(2d)
565, cert. denied, 423 US 849 (1975) (only legally admissible evidence may be introduced).
At least as a general rule, however, in Ohio the rules of
evidence appear to apply in transfer hearings. Evidence
Rule 101 provides that the Rules of Evidence "govern
proceedings in the courts of this state and before courtappointed referees of this state ...."Accordingly, the
Rules of Evidence apply in transfer hearings. There is,
however, an important exception. Evidence Rule
101(C)(6) exempts from the Rules of Evidence proceedings in which other rules prescribed by the Ohio
Supreme Court govern evidentiary matters. Thus, where
the Rules of Evidence are in conflict with any other rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court, the "other rule" prevails. For example, Juvenile Rule 32(A)(2) expressly permits the use of a social history in transfer proceedings,
although much of the material contained in a social
history would be inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence. Juvenile Rule 2(21) defines the social history as
"the personal and family history of a child or any other
party to a juvenile proceeding and may include the prior
record of the person with the juvenile court or any other
court."
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, the Ohio
Supreme Court had upheld the use of a social history at
a transfer hearing, despite its hearsay character. State v
Carmichael, 35 OS(2d) 1, 298 NE(2d) 568 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 US 1161 (1974). See also State v Riggins, 68
App(2d) 1, 7, 426 NE(2d) 504,509 (1980) ("The Ohio
Supreme Court has held that hearsay evidence is admissible at a relinquishment proceeding in Juvenile
Court in the form of psychiatric reports from the Ohio
Youth Commission Juvenile Diagnostic Center."). In Carmichael, however, the Court also indicated that the
psychiatrists and psychologists whose opinions appeared in the social history could have been called as
witnesses: "[T]hey were never called, nor was any effort
made to call them by defense counsel, even though
counsel had access to those documents for more than
two months prior to the hearing." 35 OS(2d) at 3-4.
The issue of whether the right of confrontation applies
at a transfer hearing was raised in State v. Riggin·s, 68
App(2d) 1, 426 NE(2d) 504 (1989). In that case, the defendant contended that he was denied due process because he was deprived of the opportunity to confront the
witnesses against him, i.e., the confession of a codefendant was read into evidence by a police officer. The court
overruled this objection because the defendant failed to
provide a transcript to support his allegations. /d. at 7-8.
Under Evidence Rule 801, the confession of a codefendant is-inadmissible hearsay.

tory hearings, and in other cases the Court has stated
that the privilege is applicable in any proceeding "civil or
criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might
incriminate (a person] in future criminal proceedings."
Lefkowitz v Turley, 414 US 70, 77 (1973). The Court has
also held that a criminal defendant's exercise of his right
to remain silent may not be commented upon or used
against him at trial. Griffin v California, 380 US 609
(1965). See also In re Jackson, 21 OS(2d) 215, 220-21,
257 NE(2d) 74, 78 (1970) (no Griffin violation found).
By testifying at a transfer hearing, the child waives the
privilege against self-incrimination. Whether the child's
statement may be later used at a criminal trial or at an adjudicatory hearing is unclear. If his statements may be used against him at a later time, the child is placed in an
untenable position. He either must give up the privilege
or his right to be heard at the transfer hearing. The U.S.
Supreme Court considered an analogous situation in
Simmons v. United States, 390 US 377 (1968), which
involved a similar choice facing criminal defendants in
supression hearings:
Thus, in this case [the defendant] was obliged either to
give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a
valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In
these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert
another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in
support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted
against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
objection. /d. at 394.

Several courts have applied this reasoning to transfer
hearings: "(C)andid testimony by the juvenile at the
fitness hearing should be encouraged to aid in the determination of where best to try the minor; fairness to the
minor requires that this testimony not be given at the expense of the privilege against self-incrimination." Sheila
0 v Superior Court, 125 Cal App(3d) 812, 816-17, 178 Cal
Rptr 418, 420 (1981). Accordingly, statements made at
transfer hearings have been held inadmissible at subsequent criminal trials and adjudicatory hearings. Ramona
R v Superior Court, 210 Cal Rptr 204 (Cal 1985); Bryan v
Superior Court, 7 Cal(3d) 575, 586-87, 498 P(2d) 1079,
1087, 102 Cal Rptr 831, 839-40 (1972), cert. denied, 410
US 944 (1973); Commonwealth v Ransom, 446 Pa 457,
467-68, 288 A(2d) 762, 767 (1972); Sheila 0 v Superior
Court, 125 Cal App(3d) 812, 816-17, 178 Cal Rptr 418, 420
(1981) (except for impeachment). see also IJA-ABA Standards at 50-51 (1980).
Access to Reports
Juvenile Rule 32(C) provides for the right to inspect a
social history or report of a mental or physical examination a reasonable time prior to the transfer hearing.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kent held that counsel had a
right of access to social service records. The Court left
no doubt that the right of inspection was intended to permit counsel to challenge the accuracy of these reports:
[l]f the staff's submissions include materials which are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role
of counsel to "denigrate" such matter. There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy attached to staff reports. If a
decision on waiver is "critically important" it is equally of
"critical importance" that the material submitted to the

Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination applies in
transfer hearings. REM v State, 532 SW(2d) 645, 648 (Tex
Civ App 1975). In In re Gault, 387 US 1, 55 (1967), the U.S.
Supreme Court held the privilege applicable to adjudica-
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reasons, as contemplated by Juv. R. 30 (G). The "reasonable grounds" for the court's belief that a juvenile is not
amenable to rehabilitation and that the community's safety
may require his legal restraint must be spelled out with
reasonable specificity. Stated differently, Juv. R. 30(G)
necessitates findings of fact from which to determine the
prerequisites in Juv. R. 30(C)(1) and (2) and upon which to
base the transfer order. /d. at 7.

judge ... be subjected ... to examination, criticism and

refl:itation.Wnile'ttieJoveHiilercounjUdge rnay, ofcourse,
receive ex parte analyses and recommendations from his
staff1 b,ei!I!:!Y}'l_()l,f()rthe purp()§es of a decision on waiver,
receive and rely upon secret information, whether emanating from his staff or otherwise. 383 US at 563.

Rule 32(C) grants the court authority to deny or limit
inspection for go9d cause. Th,e, Po!-lrt llll:!Y also order that
the contents of the report be withheld from specified persons. The court, ho~.Vever, must state reasons for its
action.

~

'fJ

See also State v Reuss, No. WD-81-26 (6th Dist Ct App,
Wood, 8-7-81) (bare recitation of factors in Juv A 30(E) is
insufficient). Courts in other jurisdictions have also insisted upon specific reasons for transfer. See Summers v
State, 248lnd 551,569-70,230 NE(2d) 320, 325 {1967);
RisnervCommonwealth, 508 SE(2d) 775 (Ky 1974); In re
Heising, 29 Or App 903, 907-08, 565 P(2d) 1105, 1107
(1977); Knott v Langlois, 102 Rl517, 524,231 A(2d) 767,
770 (1967). See also IJA-ABA Standards at 33-34.

Right to Present Evidence
Although the Juveni le-Rules-do-not-specifically,recognize a child's rightto present evidence at a transfer hearing, there seems little question that this right exists. See
Summers v State,2~~ lnq~5J,5(:3Q,~30NE(2d) 320,325
(1967); In re Brown, 183 NW(2d) 731, 733 (Iowa 1971); In
re Doe, 86 NM 37, 38,519 P(2d)133, 134(1974). The right
to counsel, the right to notice, and' the right of access to
the social history all imply a right to present evidence. In
a different context, the U.S. Supreme Court has commented: "Ordinarily, the righito present evidence is
basic to a fair hearing ...."Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US
539, 566 (1974). The Ohio Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized this right. In one case the Court commented
on a defens~ counsel's failure to make any effort to call
witnesses at a transfer hearing. State v. Carmichael, 35
OS(2d) 1, 298 NE(2d) 568 (1973), cert. denied, 414 US
1161 (1974). See also State vYoss, 10 App(2d) 47, 50,225
NE(2d) 275, 277-78 (1967) (Kent requires the Juvenile
Court to consider additional evidence offered by a
juvenile in a transfer hearing).

Right to a Transcript
Juvenile Rule 37(A) provides for the right to a complete
record of ali juVenile court hearings upon request. Moreover, one Ohio court, citing due process and equal protection grounds, has held that an indigent juvenile has a
right to a transcript in transfer proceedings. State v Ross,
23 App(2d) 215,216-17, 262 NE(2d) 427, 429 (1970). The
importance of a transcript is illustrated by State v. Riggins, 68 App(2d) 1, 426 NE(2d) 504 (1980), in which the
appellate court overruled an alleged error at a transfer
hearing because the "appellant has failed to provide this
court with a transcript of the hearing before the Juvenile
Court at which this evidence was presented." /d. at 7-8,
426 NE(2d) at 509. See also F. Bailey & H. Rothblatt,
Handling Juvenile Delinquency Cases 183 (1982) ("insist
that the proceedings be transcribed").

Statement
of Reasons
- . -··--··----···----·--··RC 2151.26(F) and Juvenile Rule 30 (G) require the
court to state reasons if it decides to transfer the child.
aiso.required a-stateThe u.s. Suprem-e'
ment of the reasons:

C

POST-TRANSFER ISSUES
Retention of Jurisdiction
If the juvenile court decides to retain jurisdiction, it
must schedule a hearing on the merits. Juv A 30(D). One
court has stated that a juvenile judge is not disqualified
from presiding at an adjudicatory hearing because of his
involvement in a prior transfer hearing. In re Terry H, 1
OBR 377, 378 (CP 1982). In contrast, the IJA-ABA Standards recognize a child's right to disqualify the transfer
hearing judge from -participating in subsequent proceedings: "No matter how fair the waiver judge may be in
subsequent proceedings, an impression of unfairness
will exist." IJA-ABA Standards at 52. See also Donald L. v
Superior Court, 7 Cal(3d) 592,598, 498 P(2d) 1098, 1101,
102 Cal Rptr 850, 853 (1972) ("[l]f the referee or judge
who hears the issue of fitness decides that the minor
should be retained in the juvenile court, he may not
thereafter properly preside at a contested hearing on the
issue of jurisdiction.").

ca'uri"inkent

Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court
should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions. It
must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating
the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant
facts. It may not "assume" thatthere are adequatefreasons,
nor may it merely assume that "full investigation" has been
made. Accordingly, we hold that it is incumbent upon the
Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefore.' We do not
read the statute a~ requiring that this statement must be
formal or tf1~t it s_holll9 n'rc::e.ss11rily ipclude conventional
findings offacU3ut tile statemenfstiould be sufiic1Emt to
demonstrate that the statutory requirement of "full investigation" has been met; and that the question has received
the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must
set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to
permit meaningful review. 383 US at 561.

The Ohio courts are divided over th1s requirement. In
State v. Oviedo, 5 App(3d) 168, 450NE(2d) 700 (1982),
the court held that Rule 30(G) is satisfied if the transfer
order demonstrates that the "full investigation" requirement has been met and the issue has received the full
attention of the court. In contrast, the court in State v.
Newton, No. F-82-17 (6th Dist Ct App, Fulton, 6-10-83),
required more:

Transfer of Jurisdiction
If the juvenile court decides to transfer jurisdiction,
it will set the terms and conditions for release of the child
in accordance with Criminal Rule 46. Juv A 30(H).If the
child is in detention he may be transferred to the appropriate officer or detention facility in accordance with the
law governing the detention of adults. RC 2151.312(A).
The criminal court to which jurisdiction has been transferred may not "review the factual findings of the juvenile
court on the issue of amenability." State v Whiteside, 6

Mere recitation of the conclusory language set forth in
Juv. R. 30(C)(1) and (2) is not sufficient. Conclusions are not
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App(3d) 30,36-37,452 NE(2d) 332,339 (1982).
RC 2151.26(F) provides that "transfer abates the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint." This provision
appears to require that the juvenile court transfer jurisdiction over all delinquent acts before these acts can be
prosecuted in the·criminal courts. In State v. Adams, 69
· OS(2d) 120, 431 NE(2d) 326 (1982), however, the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled otherwise. According to the Court,
once a child is properly transferred, he is considered
bound over for all felonies, even if the other felonies have
notbeen subject to transfer proceedings. /d. at 126~27.
Moreover, once transferred, child may be tried in the
criminal courts for any subsequent felonies that he has
committed. /d. RC 2151.26(G) now provides that once
transferred and convicted, a child is automatically subject to criminal court jurisdiction for subsequent charges
of aggravated murder, murder, an aggravated felony of
the first or second degree, or felonies of the first or second degree. This provision was not applicable at the
time the child in Adams was transferred. 69 OS(2d) at
126-27 n.3.
Once a child is transferred, a grand jury may indict for
any offense appropriate under the facts; the grand jury is
not limited to the charges filed in juvenile court. /d. at
124-25 (a grand jury does not exceed its authority by
returning indictments on charges which were not originally filed in juvenile court); State v Klingenberger, 113 OS
418, 425, 149 NE 395, 397 (1925). Moreover, a criminal
defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial does not
commence until the juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction. State ex rei Williams v Court of Common Pleas, 42
OS(2d) 433,434, 329 NE(2d) 680, 681 (1975); State v
Steele, 8 App(3d) 137,8 OBR 194,456 NE(2d) 513 (1982);
State v Trapp, 52 App(2d) 189, 368 NE(2d) 1278, 1279-80
(1977); State v Young, 44 App(2d) 387, 388, 339 NE(2d)
668, 669 (1975). In addition, a defendant is entitled to
good time credit for the time spent in juvenile custody.
State v Young, 44 App(2d) 387, 388-89, 339 NE(2d) 668,
669-70 (1975). By pleading guilty in criminal court, a
defendant does not waive the right to contest the validity
of the transfer decision. State v Riggins, 68 App(2d) 1,
4-5,426 NE(2d) 504,507-08 (1980).

To permit interlocutory review of such an order would obviously delay the prosecution of any proceeding in either the
juvenile or the criminal division, with the result that the prospect of a just disposition would be jeopardized.ln either
proceeding. the primarY issue is the ascertainment of innocence or guilt of the person charged. To permit interlocutory
review would subordinate that primary issue and defer its
consideration while the question of the punishment appropriate for a suspect whose guilt has not yet been ascertained is being litigated in reviewing courts. We are unwilling to
sanction such a procedure. In re Becker, 39 OS(2d) 84, 86,
314 NE(2d) 158, 159(1974) (quoting People v Jiles, 43 111(2d)
145, 150, 251 NE(2d) 529, 531 (1969)).

a

There is, however, a serious disadvantage to this rule.
The time consumed during the prosecution of the case in
criminal court and during the appellate process may
place the defendant beyond the age jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. In this event, an appellate court that finds
error in a transfer proceeding must either free the improperly transferred individual, because neither juvenile
nor criminal court has jurisdiction, or reconstruct the
transfer process to determine whether a hearing free
from error would have resulted in transfer. IJA-ABA Standards at 53. The Kent case illustrates this problem. By
the time the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Morris Kent's
conviction, he was over 21 years of age and thus no
longer subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. The Court
remanded the case to the District Court for a de novo
consideration of the transfer issue, i.e., a reconstructed
waiver hearing. 383 US at 564-65. The difficulty with this
procedure is that the reconstructed hearing must "attempt to imagine" the child as he was at the time of the
original transfer hearing. IJA-ABA Standards at 53.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Breed v. Jones, 421 US 519 (1975), the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed a California procedure that permitted transfer after a child had been found delinquent in
an adjudicatory hearing. The Court held that this procedure violated the double jeopardy clause: "We believe
it is simply too late in the day to conclude ... that a
juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has committed acts that
violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences
include both the stigma inherent in such a determination
and the deprivation of liberty for many years." /d. at 529.
In a footnote, however, the Court distinguished the
California procedure from a transfer procedure requiring
only a finding of probable cause: "We note that nothing
decided today forecloses States from requiring, as a
prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial evidence that he committed the offense charged, so long as
the showing required is not made in an adjudicatory proceeding .... The instant case is not one in which the
judicial determination was simply a find of, e.g., probable
cause. Rather, it was an adjudication that respondent
had violated a criminal statute." /d. at 538 n.18.
In Sims v. Engle, 619 F(2d) 598 (6th Cir 1980), cert.
denied, 450 US 936 (1981), the Sixth Circuit held that the
Ohio procedure operative in that case suffered from the
same deficiencies that marked the California procedure
in Breed. Under that procedure a juvenile court was required to make a delinquency finding prior to transfer.

APPEALS
In Ohio a juvenile court order transferring jurisdiction
to the criminal courts is not a final appealable order. In re
Becker, 39 OS(2d) 84, 314 NE(2d) 158 (1974). Accord
State ex rei Torres v Simmons, 68 OS(2d) 118, 428 NE(2d)
862 (1981}; State v Whiteside, 6 App(3d) 30, 6 OBR 140,
452 NE(2d) 332 (1982). See generally Comment, Juvenile

Court and Direct Appeal from Waiver of Jurisdiction in
Ohio, 8 Akron L Rev 499 (1975). Thus, a transfer order
may be challenged on appeal only after trial and conviction in the criminal courts. Simlarly, a writ of prohibition
may not be used to challenge a transfer order. State ex
rei Torres v Simmons, 68 OS(2d) 118, 428 NE(2d) 862
(1981). Although a number of jurisdictions permit appeals
of transfer orders, the Ohio rule appears to be the majority rule. See IJA-ABA Standards 53.
The Ohio Supreme Court has provided the following
reasons for its position:
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former procedure, the present transfer procedure requires
only a finding of probable cause and not a determination
of delinquency. The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of this procedure: ''We reject the contention that
the introduction of evidence of dprobable c~uhse to believe
appellant committed the allege offense w1t out more,
transformed the hearing into an adjudicatory proceeding:•
Keener v Taylor, 640 F(2d) 839, 841-42 (6th Cir 1981). Accord State v Salmon, No 43328 & 43329 (8th Dist Ct
App, Cuyahoga, 5-21-81).

In reJack.Son; 21 OS(2d) 215, 257 NE(2d) 74 (1970). Acthe Sixth Circuit, this procedure violated the
cording
doubletjeopatdy·guarantee: "Once the Juvenile Court,
pos5essirig the jurisdiction and power to enter final orders
levying a wide. range of possible sanctions, began a hearing, not limited in scope by statute to a preliminary hearing or probable cause hearing, jeopardy attached and appellant possessed the constitutional right to have the
Juvenile Court, as the original trier of fact, determine his
fate." 619 F(2d) at 605. See also Johnson v Perini, 644
F(2d) 573 (6th Cir 1981) (Sims does not apply if the
recoftfplaihly esta51isheertliafttil:rtraf1sfeniearing was
limited to a probable cause determination).
The statute that the SiXth Circuit found constitutionally
defective in Sims has sillce tieen amended. Unlike the

to
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